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ABSTRACT 
Often, central bank independence (CBI) is seen as one of the optimal institutional 
devices to guarantee price stability. The ample literature on CBI suggests that CBI is 
negatively correlated with inflation. Consequently, the turn of the 20th century has seen 
several countries enshrine in their central bank’s charter what its limits of independence 
are. Empirical studies on central bank independence, however, yield inconclusive results 
due, in part, to the difficulty in conceptualizing and measuring CBI. In the literature, the 
often-used indicators of CBI, legal-based CBI indices are based on the autonomy enjoyed 
by central banks as covered in their charter. Other attempts have been made to estimate 
the actual independence enjoyed by central banks.  
Empirical studies on CBI using either legal-based indices or estimates of actual 
CBI have yielded unrobust results that are very sensitive to the used CBI indicator. In 
developing countries, this issue is more profound as most studies use legal-based CBI 
indices in empirical studies. This study adopts the methodology of Eijffinger, Rooij, and 
Schaling (1996) to estimate an empirical CBI index. Together with a legal-based index of 
CBI obtained, the study carries out a Pearson correlation between the two measures of 
CBI and inflation in 14 sub-Saharan African countries from 1990-2016.  
The findings are as follows: when the legal-based CBI indicator was used, the 
correlation between central bank independence and inflation was almost non-existent, 
inconclusive and statistically insignificant. On the other hand, when the empirical CBI 
index was employed to perform the Pearson’s correlation between inflation and central 
bank independence, the results were consistent with theory. More importantly, empirical 
results proved to be sensitive to the CBI indicator employed. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Since the turn of the 20th century, central bank independence (CBI) has dominated 
debates seeking the optimal institutional device to guarantee price stability. The case for 
CBI is simple: a central bank with an explicit mandate to achieve price stability together 
with a high level of independence is in pole position to secure price stability (Eijffinger & 
de Haan, 1996, p.1). Formal work in CBI only began in the 1980s with several studies 
developing the theories, models, and indices employed to examine CBI empirically 
(Rogoff, 1985; Cukierman, 1992; Persson & Tabellini, 1993; Eijffinger & de Haan, 
1996). These studies primarily sought to either provide a measure or index for CBI or 
investigate the relationships between CBI and several macroeconomic variables notably 
inflation and output growth in both developing and developed countries to make a case 
for more independence for central banks. 
1.1.1 WHAT IS CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE? 
As a concept, CBI is difficult to define or quantify (Eijffinger, Rooij, & Schaling, 
1996). Most often however, CBI captures how a central bank relates to the government as 
modeled after the relation between the judiciary and the government (Eijffinger & de 
Haan, 1996, p.1). Such a relation should prevent the government, except in exceptional 
circumstances, from inhibiting the central bank from exercising its core mandates 
(Lucotte, 2009, p.4). This form of CBI is termed as institutional independence or legal 
independence as it reflects the legal guarantees a central bank has to carry its tasks and 
duties without political or any external interference (Issing, 2006, p.67). Legal central 
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bank independence is perhaps the relatively easier type of CBI to conceptualize and 
measure as it is based on what is enshrined in a central bank’s charter. 
1.1.2 LEGALITY ONLY GOES SO FAR 
The literature on CBI, however, makes a fine distinction between legal independence 
and actual independence. The former refers to the autonomy a central bank has as 
enshrined in its charter. The latter, on the other hand, does not only depend on legislation 
but also, on several factors such as such the quality of bank personnel, management style 
of central bankers as well as informal arrangements between the central bank and the 
government (Eijffinger & de Haan, 1996, p.22). Though clearly, actual independence is a 
more comprehensive conceptualization of central bank independence, most empirical 
works on central bank independence use legal-based CBI indicators as a measure of CBI 
when they study the relationship between CBI and inflation. This is partly because legal 
independence is relatively easier to measure because it is defined by legislation, which 
can easily be accessed in the bank’s charter.  
Notwithstanding, legal CBI only pertains to one aspect of actual central bank 
independence (Cukierman, 1991). In existing literature, empirical studies using legal-
based indices of CBI yield results that are not robust as results are very sensitive to the 
indicator of CBI used (Lucotte, 2009). Prominent among the several reasons explaining 
the inconsistent empirical results based on legal CBI is the one by Cukierman, Webb, and 
Neyapti (1992). They argue that central bank laws do not fully define the limit of 
authority of central bankers. In developing countries, Cukierman et al (1992) contend that 
this divergence between the legal independence and the actual independence central 
banks enjoy is substantially higher in developing countries than in industrial countries as 
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legality only goes as far a country’s respect for the rule of law and studies show that 
developing countries tend to be more resistant to the rule of law (Weingast, 2009).  
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In developing countries, particularly sub-Saharan African countries with little regard 
for the rule of law, employing legal-based indices developed by Cukierman et al (1991) 
as a measure for CBI in empirical studies as done in previous works (by Presnak, 2005; 
Kasseeah, Weng, & Moheeput, 2011) is problematic. This is because empirical results 
based on legal CBI indices have been inconsistent with theory (Fischer, 1995). Based on 
the findings of Cukierman et al (1992), who examined CBI in a group of 51 developing 
countries and found a positive rather than negative relationship between CBI measured 
with legal indices and inflation, Fischer (1995) concludes that legal-based CBI index may 
not be an appropriate measure of CBI for developing economies. Fischer (1995) offers a 
plausible explanation: Legal CBI laws are not strictly observed in these developing 
countries. This makes legal CBI indices poor indicators of CBI in developing economies.  
Attempts have been made in the literature to capture actual CBI as opposed to legal 
CBI using monetary policy reaction functions. Eijffinger et al (1996) employ a panel of 
ten industrial countries with a monetary response function developed by Koskela and 
Viren (1991) to estimate CBI based on the non-legal definition. Similarly, Fry (1998) 
estimates actual CBI in developing countries using a monetary policy reaction function 
and the assumption that fiscal policy typically eclipses the other macroeconomic policies 
(pp. 512). This study would thus adopt a similar methodology as Eijffinger et al (1996) 
and Fry (1998) to estimate an index for actual CBI in sub-Saharan Africa to complement 
existing literature while addressing the shortcomings highlighted above.  
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1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 
This study will attempt to answer the following question: 
• What are the socio-political and economic factors that determine actual CBI in 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)? 
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This study aims 
• To determine the extent that legal CBI reflects actual CBI in SSA 
• To determine if CBI is correlated with inflation in SSA 
1.5 RELEVANCE OF STUDY 
The reemergence of debates on CBI has led many to question whether CBI still 
matters. For sub-Saharan African economies with the mission to reform their fiscal and 
monetary policies to achieve economic growth, the need to join the CBI debate is more 
pressing. In the problem statement, the overt divide between legal CBI and actual CBI 
and the need for governments to do more to guarantee the actual autonomy of central 
banks to carry out their mandate have been highlighted, hence, the reason for this study. 
This study contributes to existing literature by attempting to empirically estimate 
actual CBI index on a panel of 14 sub-Saharan African economies to assess the effect of 
central-bank independence on inflation. It also augments the aspect of the literature that 
solely employs legal CBI indices to evaluate the relationship between CBI and 
macroeconomic variables in sub-Saharan Africa. More so, the findings in this study can 
inform lawmakers to set up regulations to restrict governments intervention in monetary 
policy formation. 
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1.6 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This research serves to add to existing literature on the subject. It focuses on two CBI 
indicators, a legal index, CWN and an empirical index, and inflation between the period 
of 1990-2011. The data period was chosen to give a more current and objective finding as 
in this period, the central banks of countries under discussion began to enjoy more legal 
independence. Thus, the Pearson correlation undertaken in this study between CBI and 
inflation best explains trends within the scope of the data periods. Hence, caution must be 
exercised when making generalization based on findings from this paper. Findings are 
best limited to the selected SSA countries and to the years under review or years that are 
reasonably close to those observed in this paper. 
1.7 OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study adopts the methodology of Presnak (2005), albeit on a different dataset. 
Using a pool of data from 14 sub-Saharan African countries, the study will estimate an 
empirical index of CBI, in addition to a legal index of CBI obtained from the study by 
Bodea and Hicks (2015) who extends the CWN index developed by Cukierman et al 
(1992). Similar to Presnak’s (2005) research, this study carries out a Pearson correlation 
between the two measures of CBI and inflation. 
 The SSA countries under study are Angola, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Malawi, Mauritius, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. The studies by Nhavira and Ocran (2014) and Presnak (2005) provide the 
basis for selecting these countries based on their relatively high level of legal 
independence. The methodology of this study differs from Presnak’s (2005) in three 
dimensions: Firstly, it uses an empirical index of CBI developed using the framework of 
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Eijffinger et al (1996) as informal independence instead of TOR. In addition, a relatively 
larger sample is used. Finally, the sample period, 1990-2016 is more current and relevant. 
1.8 OUTLINE OF STUDY 
The rest of the study is outlined as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the literature by 
evaluating both the theoretical underpinnings and the empirical work on CBI. Chapter 3 
captures and discusses the methodology employed in the research. Chapter 4 analyzes the 
data collected with panel data econometric analysis and Pearson’s correlation analysis. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I provide a brief review of the theories underlying central-bank 
independence. In addition, I review the extensive empirical studies on the central-bank 
independence investigating the effect of central-bank independence on policy outcomes 
such as inflation. Finally, I provide an overview of central-banking in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
2.1 THEORETICAL REVIEW 
The more prominent theory underlying central-bank independence stems from 
arguments by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and further developed by Barro and Gordon 
(1983) on the time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy-making. Time-
inconsistency problem arises when an optimal policy planned for some future time 
becomes obsolete and less optimal when that future time starts (Eijffinger and de Haan, 
1996, p.5). In the framework of monetary policy, time-inconsistency problem arises 
because there exist incentives for a politically motivated policymaker to exploit the short-
run Phillips curve (Kasseeah et al, 2011). That is, as government suffers an inflationary 
bias to pursue expansionary policies for short-run output growth at the expense of rising 
inflation, year-on-year inflation becomes sub-optimal (de Haan et al, 2008, p.718).  
A study by Rogoff (1985) affirms that, indeed, inflationary bias resulting from time-
inconsistency problem exists when central banks are under government influence. Thus, 
delegating monetary policy to a more conservative and independent central bank, which 
is often inflation-averse than the government can reduce this inflationary bias (Rogoff, 
1985; de Haan et al, 2008; Nhavira & Ocran, 2014). Eijffinger and de Haan (1996) 
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further identify two other theoretical arguments made for why central bank independence 
is desirable: the public-choice view and arguments based on the analysis of Sargent and 
Wallace (1981) (p. 4).  
The public-choice view, according to Eijffinger and de Haan (1996), suggests that 
central banks will render above optimal inflation when they are exposed to strong 
political pressures to act in accordance with government’s preference. In contrast, 
Sargent and Wallace (1981) suggest that the extent to which central banks can finance 
government deficit without compromising achieving their mandate determines the level 
of inflation. The conclusion thus far is simple: the more independent a central bank, the 
less compelled it is to finance government deficit through seigniorage (Kasseeah et al, 
2011). All these theoretical grounds simply answer the question why central-bank 
independence would yield lower rates of inflation, ceteris paribus (Eijffinger & de Haan, 
1996).  
2.2 EMPIRICAL REVIEW 
Empirical evidence shows that industrial countries with independent central banks 
tend to have lower inflation. In developing countries, empirical results are not robust. 
2.2.1 EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON OECD COUNTRIES 
Most of the significant empirical work in this literature was published in the 1980s: 
seminal articles by (Bade & Parkin, 1988; Grilli, Masciandaro & Tabellini, 1991; 
Cukierman, Webb & Neyapti, 1992; Alesina & Summers, 1993) form the basis for 
empirical analysis on CBI. Most empirical studies usually explore the relationship 
between central bank independence and a policy outcome such as inflation outcome, 
budget deficit, and output growth. Measuring or choosing an appropriate measure of 
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central-bank independence for empirical studies still remains the first and main challenge 
of undertaking empirical studies on CBI (Lucotte, 2009).  
The first paper, by Bade and Parkin (1988), regresses inflation on a legal index of 
CBI capturing only political independence. They develop a (1-4) scale of legal index of 
CBI by examining the characteristics of central bank laws of twelve OECD countries. 
Their results were consistent with theory: they found that countries with highly 
independent central banks had significantly lower average rate of inflation. Similarly, 
Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) investigate whether inflation is related to 
central-bank independence in 18 OECD countries. Unlike Bade and Parkin (1988), Grilli 
et al (1991) distinguish between, and develop two indexes for, economic independence 
and political independence of central banks: The former borders on freedom of a 
monetary authority to choose the final goals of policy while the latter refers to the central 
bank’s autonomy to choose their preferred instruments of monetary policy (Grilli et al, 
1991, p.368).  
Grilli et al estimate the effect of the two indexes of CBI: indexes for economic and 
political independence respectively on inflation rate over the sample period of 1950-
1989. Similar to Bade and Parkin (1988), their result is consistent with theory: the two 
indicators of central-bank independence have the expected (negative) sign. The 
methodology employed by Grilli et al allows them to make yet a significant observation: 
Grilli et al divide the sample period into four decades and estimate, using seemingly 
unrelated regressions, the effect of the indicators of central-bank independence on 
inflation over the four decades. They found that the indicator of political independence is 
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significant only in the 1970s while the indicator of economic independence is significant 
only in the periods of high inflation (Grill et al, 1991). 
A study by Alesina and Summers (1993) goes beyond investigating the relation 
between inflation and CBI to finding the correlation between CBI and levels of real 
economic growth such as output, unemployment, and real interest rates. Their measure of 
CBI is the average of the legal indicators developed by Bade and Parkin (1988) and 
Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991). With data from 16 OECD countries over a 
sample period of 1955-1988, Alesina and Summers (1993) plot the various measures of 
economic performance against their measure of CBI. They found the following: inflation 
and central bank independence are near perfect negatively correlated. There appears to be 
no correlation between central-bank independence and economic growth measured with 
Real GNP growth. Similarly, they found that unemployment and real interest rate have no 
clear relation with their measure of CBI. 
The fourth, and quite comprehensive, seminal paper in this literature, by Cukierman, 
Webb, and Neyapti (1992) undertakes a similar exercise relating inflation to central-bank 
independence. The study by Cukierman et al differ from earlier studies (Bade & Parkin, 
1988; Grilli, Masciandaro & Tabellini, 1991) in three dimensions: Firstly, their study 
employs a larger set of countries (21 industrial and 51 developing countries. In addition, 
the sample period goes as far back to the 1950s. Finally, they develop, in addition to a 
more comprehensive legal index of CBI, three other measures of CBI to capture actual 
CBI in practice.  
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In developing their legal index of CBI, Cukierman et al aggregate sixteen legal 
variables based on information from central banks’ charter. The more prominent measure 
among the other three indicators is the Turnover Rates (TOR) of central bank governors 
as it is often used as a proxy for actual central-bank independence (Lucotte, 2009). 
Cukierman et al (1992) estimate the effect of the four indicators of CBI on inflation rate 
over the sample period of 1950-1989 by running regressions on inflation with the 
indicators of central-bank independence over the entire dataset. They also run regressions 
on two subsamples including only industrial countries and only developing countries 
respectively. For industrial countries, the aggregate legal index has statistically 
significant coefficient with the expected (negative) sign. This is in stark contrast to results 
on developing countries: the aggregate legal index is statistically insignificant. 
Uncharacteristically, the expected sign of the coefficient of the aggregate legal index is 
also positive, which suggests that the higher the independence, the higher inflation. This 
is inconsistent with theory. 
Fischer (1995) offers some insight to explain these anomalous empirical results by 
Cukierman et al’s (1992) on developing countries. In his view, central bank laws are 
often not observed in these countries. In short, the independence of central banks, as 
enshrined in their charter, does not reflect what occurs in practice. Thus, legal index of 
central-bank independence may differ greatly from actual CBI resulting in inconsistent 
empirical results. In their study, Cukierman et al (1992) offer a more comprehensive 
criticism of legal indicators of central-bank independence: They identify two fundamental 
shortcomings of indicators based on law:  
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First, the laws [central bank laws] are incomplete in that they cannot specify explicitly the 
limits of authority between the central bank and the political authorities under all 
contingencies. These voids are filled by tradition at best and by power politics at worst. 
Second, even when the law is quite explicit, actual practice may deviate from it (Cukierman 
et al, 1992, p.355).  
To address the above shortcomings of legal indicators of CBI identified by 
Cukierman et al (1991), Eijffinger, Rooij, & Schaling (1996) adopts a somewhat different 
approach to measure CBI. The authors pool quarterly data from 1977 to 1990 for 10 
OECD countries and regress interest rate on inflation, GDP growth rate, current account 
balance as a percentage of GDP. Using panel data regression techniques, they extrapolate 
unobserved heterogeneity across countries that they interpret as an empirical index of 
central-bank independence. To them, the unobserved heterogeneity across countries 
capture structural differences that affect monetary authorities’ ability to respond to 
inflation, output, and current account surplus. The empirical results of their study are 
consistent with theory: They found that their empirical index for actual CBI showed a 
significant negative relationship between CBI and inflation.  
2.2.2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Following the studies of Cukierman et al (1991) which provided inconsistent results, 
studies, such as Presnak (2005), Lucotte (2009) and Kasseeah et al (2011), have 
investigated the effect of CBI on inflation in developing economies and particularly, in 
sub-Saharan Africa. For these studies, the legal index of CBI developed by Cukierman et 
al (hereafter CWN) remains the more widely used indicator of CBI. Few employ TOR as 
an alternative measure of CBI. Generally, empirical results in this part of the literature are 
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contradictory. In one study, results are consistent with theory; in another, results are 
inconsistent.  
A study by de Haan and Sikken (1998) employs various indicators for central bank 
independence to examine the relationship between central bank independence and 
government budget deficits. Their research tests the fiscal dominance theory developed 
by Sargent and Wallace (1988). With data on 30 developing countries for the sample 
period 1950-1994, they regress the average budget surplus as a percentage of GDP on the 
various measures of central-bank independence. Their findings suggest that legal 
indicators of independence are not related to policy performance. The coefficient of TOR 
was consistent with theory.   
Similarly, Lucotte (2009) investigates the influence of central bank independence on 
budget deficits in developing country. He employs both CWN and TOR as the measures 
of CBI to analyze a panel of data between 1995-2004. The empirical model he specifies 
defines budget surplus as a function of GDP, CBI, agriculture as a percentage of GDP 
and other regional dummies. He estimates a panel regression of the empirical model 
using random effects models. His results were as follows: the estimated coefficient of 
CWN was statistically insignificant (Lucotte, 2009, p.16). The estimated coefficient of 
TOR was however significant and had the expected sign. His results confirm that legal 
indices are not appropriate for developing countries. Like Fischer (1995), he ascribes this 
the existence of weak institutions in developing countries which deviate from the law 
(Lucotte, 2009).  
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2.2.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN AFRICA, PARTICULARLY SSA 
Narrowing down to Africa and particularly, sub-Saharan Africa, very few empirical 
studies have been undertaken on central-bank independence (Kasseeah et al, 2011). The 
study of Presnak (2005) is by far the more comprehensive empirical study of central-bank 
independence in sub-Saharan Africa. She examines both informal and legal independence 
of central banks in eleven sub-Saharan African countries including Tanzania, Kenya, 
Zaire, Ethiopia, Uganda, Nigeria, Botswana, Zambia, Ghana, South Africa, and 
Zimbabwe (Presnak, 2005). She develops a legal indicator of central-bank based on the 
study of Cukierman et al (1991) in addition to using a proxy of actual independence, 
TOR developed also by Cukierman et al (1991). 
 The methodology employed by Presnak is as follows: First, she runs a bivariate 
analysis on the two indexes of central-bank independence (CWN and TOR) to determine 
whether legal independence reflects actual independence in the sample of sub-Saharan 
African countries using data from 1960-1980. Her study then examines the relationship 
between the legal indicator of CBI and inflation as well as the relationship between debt 
and TOR using Pearson’s correlation. Her findings are as follows. Pearson coefficient of 
correlation for legal independence (CWN) and informal independence (TOR) is 
statistically insignificant reinforcing Cukierman et al’s (1991) view that legal 
independence does not reflect actual, (in this case, informal) independence. Pearson 
coefficient of correlation for central bank independence and Inflation is insignificant for 
both indicators of CBI.  
Not only does her findings affirm the concurrent findings that using legal 
independence renders inconsistent empirical results, they also contradict Cukierman et 
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al’s findings that high informal independence (as measured by TOR) leads to low 
inflation rates in developing countries (Cukierman et al, 1991, p.372). Unlike Presnak 
(2005), the empirical study by Kasseeah et al (2011) on central bank independence in 
Africa renders more consistent results with theory. They collect a panel of data on 20 
countries from 1988 to 2007 and regress inflation rate on the exchange rate, GDP growth 
rate, unemployment, and either one of the two proxies of central-bank independence, 
TOR, and government deficit. Kasseeah et al found that TOR had the expected sign and 
was also statistically significant. 
To further affirm the wide discrepancy between legal independence and actual 
independence in sub-Saharan Africa, Tindleni (2006) assesses the central-bank 
independence in South Africa after it had adopted Inflation Targeting. He adopts the 
procedure of Cukierman et al (1991) to develop a legal indicator of CBI. In addition, he 
uses responses from structured interviews with South African Reserve Bank (SARB) as 
well as eleven economists to develop two proxies of actual CBI. He finds that the SARB 
has a significantly higher actual independence that legal independence. Though this result 
affirms that legal independence differs from actual independence in developing countries, 
the methodology to develop the two indicators of actual central-bank independence is 
problematic for two reasons: First, there is a lot of subjectivity in weighing the responses 
from the structured interviews. In addition, the views of eleven economists, mainly 
economists in the private sector, may not be representative of all economists in South 
Africa, which may distort results.  
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2.3 OVERVIEW OF CENTRAL BANKING IN SSA 
At the preliminary stages of central banking in SSA, monetary policy was 
subordinated to fiscal policy (Ajakaiye & O’Connell, 2011). Between 1960-1989, central 
banks in SSA had functioned within a developmental agenda dictated by fiscal 
authorities. Thus, the whole object of central banking in SSA was to fill chronic financing 
gaps of fiscal authorities while employing direct controls to provide insulation of 
inflation (Ajakaiye & O’Connell, 2011, p. 4).  As a result, central banks in SSA 
economies were largely undeveloped and lacked the capacity to protect themselves from 
government intervention (Presnak, 2005). That is, governments, seeking considerable 
freedom to manipulate monetary policy, established weak central banks to finance 
government deficits through seigniorage (Presnak, 2005; Kasseeah et al, 2011). This 
unsurprisingly limited CBI in SSA and inhibited the ability of central banks to implement 
inflation-fighting policies. 
In contrast to the above, the turn of 1990 witnessed the evolution of monetary policy 
in SSA. Central banks in SSA economies have covered extraordinary distance to reform 
their monetary policy. Chief among these reforms is the revision of the central banks’ 
charter to increase priority allotted to maintaining price stability. That is, countries in 
SSA elevated inflation control as the dominant objective of monetary policy (Ajakaiye & 
O’Connell, 2011, p.5). The obvious conclusion thus far is that such reforms should 
improve the independence of the central banks in SSA economies. Consequently, these 
reforms should keep inflation low and stable to reaffirm the popular consensus that the 
higher the degree of central bank independence, the lower the inflation level and its 
variability (Eijffinger & de Haan, 1996). 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to empirically assess central-bank independence in 
sub-Saharan Africa. In this chapter, I provide a detailed description of the research design 
adopted to investigate the relationship between central-bank independence and policy 
outcomes such as inflation. The data, period, and interval, as well as the data collection 
procedure, are discussed in this chapter. I also highlight in this chapter the methods of 
data analysis employed and the statistical tools used. I conclude with some limitations of 
my methodology.  
3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study uses regression and Pearson correlations to investigate the relationship 
between central-bank independence and inflation in sub-Saharan Africa. This study will 
adopt two measures of central-bank independence: the CWN legal index of CBI 
developed by Cukierman et al (1992) and an empirical index of CBI (hereafter, EMP) 
this paper estimates using a conceptual framework developed by Eijffinger et al (1996). 
The approach employed to estimate the empirical index of CBI will be further expounded 
in the chapter. This study systematically employs econometric techniques to estimate an 
empirical index of central-bank independence by pooling data on 14 sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) countries and using the fixed-effects regression models to extrapolate unobserved 
heterogeneity across countries, which it interprets as the empirical index of CBI as per 
the adopted conceptual framework.  
After estimating the empirical index of CBI, the research adopts the correlational 
approach to doing quantitative research. This allows the study to explore the relationship 
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between central-bank independence and policy outcomes such as inflation using the two 
measures of central-bank independence, CWN, and EMP with Pearson’s Correlation. 
3.2 HYPOTHESIS 
This study develops an empirical index of CBI, in addition to CWN, to assess the 
relationship between CBI and inflation. The theoretical review in Chapter 2 suggests that 
a higher degree of CBI yields lower rates of inflation. The hypotheses to be tested in this 
study is defined as follows.  
𝐻0: Central bank independence is not correlated with inflation. 
𝐻1: Central bank independence is correlated with inflation. 
3.3 DATA 
The data primarily consists annual data on interest rates, inflation rate, GDP growth 
rate and current account balance as a percentage of GDP. An index for democracy and an 
election dummy based on years when the election took place are also gathered. This type 
of data collected for the study is secondary in nature. As such, data were consolidated 
from multiple secondary sources, notably the official websites of the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The panel of data is from the 14 SSA countries 
under consideration.   
The countries included in this study was informed by the work of Nhavira and Ocran 
(2014) measuring legal independence based on the CWN (1992) approach as well as the 
study of Presnak (2005). The sampled SSA countries are as follows: Angola, Botswana, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. These countries were chosen based on the provisions in 
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their central bank charters which presuppose that these countries have instrument 
independence to choose or manipulate a monetary policy instrument to achieve its goals. 
More so, most of the countries have adopted inflation targeting which means the go-to 
monetary policy instrument of the central banks in the sample is the interest rate. 
The period under consideration begins from 1990-2016. This period was chosen due 
to the availability of data on all the variables in the model. More so, the 21-year period 
was chosen to increase the number of observations in the panel of data since high-
frequency data such as quarterly data was not available for the sampled SSA countries. 
This yields a total of 378 observations if the panel of data is completely balanced.  
3.4 DATA ANALYSIS 
This study carries out a Pearson Product-moment correlation to assess the relationship 
between central-bank independence and inflation using R. The following will be verified 
or tested to ensure that the Pearson’s correlation may lead to valid results.  
• Assumption 1: There needs to be a linear relationship between the two 
variables—CBI and inflation. This study will use scatterplots to check for 
linearity. 
• Assumption 2: There should be no significant outliers. If there exist outliers, this 
study would transform the data using double-log specification. 
• Assumption 3: The two variables must be approximately normally distributed. 
The Shapiro-Wilk test of normality will be undertaken to test for bivariate 
normality. 
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3.5 INDICATORS OF CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE USED 
This study adopts two measures of central bank independence: the CWN and the 
EMP. 
3.5.1 CWN 
CWN is a legal index of CBI developed by Cukierman et al (1992). It aggregates 
16 legal variables to reflect legal independence of central banks. The CWN index 
employed in this research is obtained from the study by Bodea and Hicks (2015) who 
extends the CWN index developed by Cukierman et al (1992) for 144 countries covering 
the years 1972 to 2015. 
3.5.2 EMP 
  The EMP is the empirical index of CBI to be estimated by this study. The study 
adopts a conceptual framework developed by Eijffinger et al (1996) to estimate the EMP. 
It is based on the work of Koskela and Viren (1991) on monetary policy reaction 
functions. Monetary policy reaction function relates a “policy instrument to a set of 
internal and external (current and lagged) target variables” (Koskela & Viren, 1991, 
p.454). The monetary policy reaction function specified in Koskela and Viren (1991) 
assumes that monetary authorities act to maximize an intertemporal welfare function, 
which is subjected to an implicit perceived (econometric) model of the economy and 
considers the lagged effect of policies. Thus, monetary authorities would either increase 
or decrease interest rate as a response to either a rise or fall in inflation, unemployment, 
or current account (Koskela & Viren, 1991).  
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The monetary policy reaction function specification adopted by Koskela and 
Viren (1991) is as follows: 
∆𝑟𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑝𝑡 + 𝑏2𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝑏3𝑦𝑡 + 𝑏4𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑏5𝑐𝑎𝑡 + 𝑏6𝑐𝑎𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡 
where r is interest rate, p is inflation rate, y is output rate and ca is current account 
surplus as a percentage of GDP.  
It is this specification above that Eijffinger et al (1996) extend as they estimated 
an empirical index of central-bank independence by estimating monetary policy reaction 
functions for ten OECD countries. They argue that central banks' reaction to inflation, 
economic growth and current account surplus using interest rate not only depend on these 
variables, but also on unobserved heterogeneity across countries. In their view, the 
unobserved heterogeneity across countries capture the “different structural pressures” 
central banks face to either raise or lower interest rates and can be interpreted as actual 
central bank independence.  
3.5.2.1 MODEL SPECIFICATION 
The econometric specification employed to estimate the EMP is expressed in the 
reduced form that fits the data as follows. 
∆𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏2𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏3𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏4𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 
+ 𝑏5𝑐𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏6𝑐𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑖 + 𝑒𝑡           (1) 
WHERE ri,t is interest rates of country i at any time t, pi,t is current value of annual 
inflation rate, pi,t−1 is lagged value of annual inflation rate, yi,t is current value of annual 
GDP growth rate, yi,t−1 is lagged value of annual GDP growth rate, cai,t is current value 
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of annual current account balance as a percentage of GDP, cai,t−1 is lagged value of 
annual current account balance as a percentage of GDP, and CBIi is the unobserved 
heterogeneity for each country i. The CBIi, according to Eijffinger et al (1996), captures 
the structural differences between the countries in the sample with respect to 
implementing monetary policy, which this study infers as an empirical index of CBI. 
However, such structural differences across individual countries cannot be observed 
directly and thus, cannot be included in the model as an observed independent variable. 
To estimate this unobserved heterogeneity across individual countries, one has to 
run a simple regression with variable intercepts (Hsiao, 2014). Specification (1) above 
can further be rewritten into a variable-intercept model as shown below. 
∆𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡     (2) 
where the 𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖 equals 𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑖 + 𝑏0 as both 𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑖 and 𝑏0 are constants and cannot be 
identified or estimated separately (Eijffinger et al, 1996, pp. 167-169). 𝑋𝑖 is the proxy for 
all the independent variables employed in this model and e captures the error term. With 
variable-intercept models, the unobserved heterogeneity across individuals can either be 
driven by individual time-invariant variables, period individual-invariant or individual 
time-varying variables (Hsiao, 2014, p. 31). Eijffinger et al (1996) assume that the CBIi is 
driven by individual time-invariant variables. Thus, unobserved heterogeneity across 
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3.5.2.2 ESTIMATING THE EMP 
The variable-intercept model specified in specification (2) can be estimated in R 
using either the least-square dummy variable (LSDV) approach or the fixed effects 
estimator approach. Either approach includes a dummy variable for each individual 
country in the panel to capture the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across 
individual countries. This study adopts the fixed effects estimator approach similar to 
Eijffinger et al (1996). As the fixed effects estimator concentrates exclusively on 
variations within the individual countries to estimate the coefficient of intercept term for 
each country, the estimation of EMP will be more efficient and the interpretation of it 
will come forward in a more natural way (Eijffinger et al, 1996). 
The independent variables of concern in specification (2) are current and lagged 
values of inflation rates, GDP growth and current account balance as a percentage of 
GDP which allows this study to extrapolate the 𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖. Lagged values of the independent 
variables are included to account for the “potential delayed effects” of the dependent 
variable (Koskela & Viren, 1991, p.445). The expected sign for inflation and output 
growth, according to Koskela and Viren (1991), is positive as higher inflation and 
economic growth demand tighter monetary policy, all else held constant. A current 
account deficit might also lead to tighter monetary policy, ceteris paribus. The following 
control variables may be included in the model: a polity index and an election timing 
dummy variable.  
To estimate the main variable of interest  𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖, I generate the coefficients of the 
dummies for each country included in the model by the fixed effects estimator. 
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3.6 LIMITATION OF METHODOLOGY 
The inference of unobserved heterogeneity across countries as the empirical index 
of CBI could be farfetched as country-specific effect is a catch-all proxy and may capture 
unobserved variables unrelated to CBI. The study may attempt to further refine the 
unobserved heterogeneity across countries to only reflect structural pressures on central 
banks to lower or raise the interest rate. In addition, the unavailability of high-frequency 
data such as quarterly data on the independent variables forces this study to include 
periods where central banks in the sample SSA countries have no legal provisions of 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
4. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the findings obtained from the research through statistical 
and empirical analysis of the data. A thorough discussion of the findings is undertaken to 
answer the research questions posed in chapter 1. The purpose of this chapter thus is to 
examine the explanatory power of two measures of central bank independence: CWN and 
EMP on inflation in sub-Saharan Africa.   
4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
Table 1 below captures the summary statistics of variables used in the study. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
GDP (growth in %) 367 4.53 4.83 4.64 -23.98 22.59 
INF-YOY (%) 370 46.93 249.12 9.61 -9.00 3792.92 
Current Account (% of GDP) 378 -2.69 7.89 -3.22 -28.70 49.98 
Discount Rate (%) 282 30.91 75.80 16 2.00 975.00 
CWN_W 344 0.42 0.10 0.40 0.22 0.63 
Polity Index 378 2.72 5.34 4 -9.00 10.00 
Election Dummy 378 0.20 0.40 0 0.00 1.00 
Source: Author’s estimates from R 
Descriptive analysis of the data revealed the following: Over the sample period of 
1990-2016, the 14 SSA economies under discussion had an average annual GDP growth 
rate of 4.53%. Year-on-year inflation averaged 46.93% with a staggering standard 
deviation of about 249.12. This suggests that central banks have not been able to achieve 
steady inflation over the period under discussion. With a wide gap between its median 
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and mean, the distribution of year-on-year inflation is skewed-to-the-right. Angola and 
Zimbabwe, with an average year-on-year inflation rate of about 381.69% and 160.83%, 
are solely responsible for the skewed distribution of inflation. I thus take the log of year-
on-year inflation for all subsequent analysis requiring the inclusion of year-on-year 
inflation. The purpose of this transformation is to bring year-on-year inflation within the 
range of skewness for a normal distribution. This can be seen below in figure 1 below. 
Figure 1: Before and After Taking Log of Year-on-Year Inflation
 
Similarly, the central bank discount rate is also slightly skewed-to-the-right. 
Zimbabwe’s spell of hyperinflation from 2007 accounts for this. Overall, the current 
account balance of the 14 SSA economies has been negative. This suggests that over the 
period of 1990-2016, the 14 SSA economies have imported more goods, services, and 
capital than they exported. The polity index, a measure of democracy averages about 2.72 
suggesting that the sample SSA economies has had a blend of democratic and autocratic 
regimes. 
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4.2 PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF CBI USING LEGAL-BASED CBI INDEX 
The legal measure of CBI, CWN employed is based on the works of Cukierman et 
al (1992). Only the weighted index of the CWN was collected and used in my analysis. I 
begin the preliminary analysis hereafter by ranking the 14 SSA economies in their degree 
of central bank independence based on their mean CWN index over the sample period. 
Ethiopia, Mauritius, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have the least independent central banks. 
Table 2: Rank of countries legal central bank independence 
 Country CWN-W 
1. Angola 0.6120 
2. Kenya 0.5289 
3. Tanzania 0.5279 
4. Ghana 0.5128 
5. Nigeria 0.4723 
6. Uganda 0.4435 
7. Namibia 0.4339 
8. Malawi 0.4032 
9. Botswana 0.3873 
10. South Africa 0.3691 
11. Zambia 0.3674 
12. Ethiopia 0.3578 
13. Mauritius 0.3173 
14. Zimbabwe 0.2697 
Source: Author’s estimates from R 
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From the estimates, Angola, Kenya and Tanzania have the relatively stronger 
legal CBI in the sample. Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, Namibia, Malawi, Botswana and South 
Africa have intermediate independent central banks. I further run a Pearson product-
moment correlation to compute the relationship between the CWN-W and year-on-year 
inflation. With a Pearson correlation coefficient of -0.03, the correlation between the 
legal measure of CBI and inflation is almost non-existent as the Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient is close to zero. Figure 2 below graphically depicts the relationship between 
CWN-W and year-on-year inflation. The line of best fit, which is the best possible 
straight line that fits the data, fitted in Figure 2 is almost horizontal with near-zero slope. 
This suggests that there is almost no relationship between CWN-W and inflation. 
Figure 2: Correlation between CWN-W and Inflation 
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 For further analysis of CBI using CWN-W, I perform a correlation test to assess 
the significance of the correlation between CWN-W and year-on-year inflation. The 
correlation test, presented in Table 3 below, failed to produce any statistically significant 
result similar to the findings of Presnak (2005).  
Table 3: Correlations for Legal Independence measure CWN-W and Inflation 
Pearson’s Coefficient Significance (Two-tailed) 
-0.03 -0.54309 [0.5874] 
*P-value in bracket  
From the results in Table 3 above, the p-value is greater than the significance 
level of 5%. Thus, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the true correlation between 
inflation and the legal-based CBI index, CWN-W is zero. That is, the correlation between 
the legal measure of CBI and inflation is almost non-existent, inconclusive and 
statistically insignificant. This conclusion is consistent with the findings of Presnak 
(2005). Yet, the conclusion above does not coincide with our intuition that with the 
improved legal CBI in SSA over the sample period, inflation and legal CBI would at least 
have a statistically significant negative relationship. 
I hereafter estimate an empirical index of CBI for further analysis of CBI. 
4.3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS: ESTIMATION OF EMPIRICAL INDEX OF CBI 
In this section, I estimate the EMP, the empirical index of CBI. Similar to 
Eijffinger et al (1996), I start of the estimation of the empirical index on the assumption 
that the unobserved heterogeneity across countries is time-invariant. I employ the fixed 
effects estimator approach to panel data analysis. Prior to that, I run a series of pre-
estimation tests on the data in order for estimates to be robust and reliable.  
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4.3.1 UNIT ROOT TEST 
A Fisher-type unit-root test based on augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) was 
performed on each of the variables in the model to test for stationarity. The hypothesis 
tested under the ADF unit root test is as follows.  
𝐻0: All panels contain unit roots 
𝐻𝑎: At least one panel is stationary 
Table 4.1 below has a summary of the Fisher-type unit root test results. 
Variable Inverse chi-squared statistic P-value 
Discount Rate 47.4258 0.0123 
INF-YOY 142.3856 0.0000 
GDP 173.9386 0.0000 
Current Account (% of GDP) 54.4849 0.0020 
Source: Author’s estimates from Stata 
From Table 4.1, the estimated p-values of the Fisher-type panel-data unit-root test 
on all the variables are less than 0.05. Based on that, I reject the null hypothesis that unit 
root exists in any of the variables. 
4.3.2 CORRELATION MATRIX (MULTICOLLINEARITY) 
 This section assesses to what extent is multicollinearity a problem in the 
regression analysis. Multicollinearity exists whenever an independent variable employed 
in a multiple regression model has a very high correlation with one or more of the other 
independent variables (Allen, 1997). All else being equal, an independent variable which 
is highly correlated with other independent variables will have relatively large standard 
errors, thereby undermining the statistical significance of that independent variable 
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(Allen, 1997, p. 177).  Near-perfect collinearity, however, makes the estimation of 
coefficients indeterminate as it becomes impossible to compute the inverse of the matrix 
of covariances among the independent variables.  
If one suspects the existence of multicollinearity in a regression model, one can 
inspect the matrix of correlations among the independent variables. Low pairwise 
correlations may indicate that multicollinearity may not be an issue in the regression 
model. Table 4.2 below presents a correlation matrix containing the correlations 
coefficients between all possible pairs of the independent variables in the regression 
model. 
Table 4.2: Correlation matrix of independent variables 
 GDP INF-YOY CUR_ACC_BAL 
GDP 1.00   
INF-YOY -0.22 1.00  
CUR_ACC_BAL 0.12 -0.06 1.00 
 From the Table 4.2 above, none of the correlations estimates are near-perfect (that 
is, close to 1 or -1). Due to the low pairwise correlations in Table 4.2 above, which may 
indicate that multicollinearity may not be an issue in the model, I retain all the variables 
in the model for subsequent analysis. 
4.3.3 THE REGRESSION OUTPUT 
 In chapter 3, we specified the model below as the variable-intercept model used to 
estimate the EMP. 
∆𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
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Table 5.1 presents initial estimations of the coefficients of the independent 
variables used in the model. I ran two separate regressions in a bid to select the best 
specification that fits the data. Regression (1) is based on the monetary policy reaction 
function specified by Eijffinger et al (1996). In regression (2), I include a polity index 
and an election dummy as control variables. The results of regression (1) differ slightly 
from regression (2).  
In both regressions, the signs of the coefficients of current and lagged year-on- 
year inflation variables, lagged GDP variable and current account balance conform to 
theory. The coefficients of these variables except current account balance have positive 
signs. This suggests that central banks respond to inflation and economic growth by 
implementing a more restrictive monetary policy. From regression (1), when previous 
year’s GDP growth rate increases by one percentage point, the central bankers respond by 
hiking rates by 0.0029 percentage point, all else constant and controlling for country 
fixed effects. Both variables of GDP growth rate are not significant at a 5% significance 
level.  
The response to current and lagged inflation is significant at both 5% and 1% 
significance level. The significance of current and lagged inflation variables suggests that 
both current and historic values of inflation are important in determining the discount rate 
for the sample of countries. Both current and lagged variables of the current account 
balance as a percentage of GDP have coefficients which are significant on 0.1% level. 
Current account balance as a percentage of GDP variable has a negative coefficient while 
the coefficient of the lagged variable is positive. To estimate the coefficients of our 
variable of interest, EMP which captures the unobserved heterogeneity across countries, I  
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Table 5.1: Panel data estimation of central bank independence 

























POLITY INDEX  0.0307 
(0.7960) 
ELECTION DUMMY  -0.0721 
(-0.3266) 
R-SQUARED 0.3631 0.3651 
ADJ R-SQUARED 0.3093 0.3053 
F-STATISTIC 21.3769 16.0281 
SUM SQR. RESID 403.19 401.93 
AIC 134.05 138.50 
SAMPLE SIZE 245 245 
T statistics in parenthesis. Significance codes: ‘*’ p < 0.05, ‘**’ p < 0.01, ‘***’ p <0.001. 
choose between regression (1) and regression (2) for the specification which best fits the 
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data. With the help of the F-Statistic, Adjusted R-Squared, Sum of Residual Squared and 
a manually computed AIC1, I make the selection. 
 Based on results in Table 5.1, I choose regression (1) as the model to be used to 
estimate the unobserved heterogeneity across countries. This is because regression (1) has 
the bigger F-Statistic, explains the variations in the dependent variable better and has the 
lower AIC. More so, adding the additional two control variables in regression (2) did not 
significantly reduce the sum of residual squared while reducing the degrees of freedom. 
Now that I have selected regression (1) as the model that best fits the data, I move on to 
perform some post-estimation tests.  
4.3.4 BREUSCH-GODFREY TEST FOR SERIAL CORRELATION 
 In this section, I test whether there exists a relationship between the error term 
and itself over the various time intervals. I use the Breusch-Godfrey test for serial 
correlation. The hypothesis tested under the Breusch-Godfrey test is as follows:  
𝐻0: no serial correlation in idiosyncratic errors  
𝐻𝑎: serial correlation in idiosyncratic errors 
Table 5.2: Results of the test for serial correlation. 
Model Chisq P-value 
Regression (1) 14.427 0.0131 
Source: Author’s estimates from R 
From the table above, the p-value is significant on a 5% significance level. I therefore 
reject the null hypothesis that no serial correlation exists in the idiosyncratic errors.   
                                                          
1 AIC = 2k + n Log(RSS/n), where k is number of independent variables, n is number of 
observations and RSS is the sum of residual squared 
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4.3.5 BREUSCH-PAGAN TEST FOR HETEROSKEDASTICITY 
In this section, I test for heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedasticity exists when the variance of 
the error term is not constant for all observations. I ran a Breusch-Pagan test to check for 
the presence of heteroscedasticity.  The hypothesis tested under the Breusch-Pagan test is 
as follows:  
𝐻0: assumption of homoscedasticity  
 𝐻𝑎: the presence of heteroscedasticity 
Table 5.3: Result of Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity 
Model BP Statistic P-value 
Regression (1) 2483.6 2.2e-16 
Source: Author’s estimates from R 
From the table above, the p-value is significant on a 5% significance level. I therefore 
reject the null hypothesis that assumes homoscedasticity.   
4.3.6 CORRECTING SERIAL CORRELATION AND 
HETEROSCEDASTICITY 
 To address the presence of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity, I re-ran 
regression (1) using a robust estimation of the covariance matrix of coefficients. The R 
software package for panel data analysis, ‘plm’ provides three flavors of White’s 
heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix (also known as the sandwich estimator) 
for estimating robust coefficients (Croissant and Millo, 2008). The three versions: 
White1, White2, and Arellano assume no correlation between errors of different groups 
in the panel data. This allows for the estimation of the covariance matrix of coefficients 
which proves consistent vs. heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. For fixed effects 
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however, Arellano’s version proves more consistent. Croissant and Millo (2008) explains 
that, with fixed effects, demeaning induces serial correlation in the errors which the two 
other versions of the sandwich estimator turn out to be inconsistent. The results of the 
regression (1) using Arellano’s version of the sandwich estimator is presented below. 
∆𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖 + 0.765𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 0.857𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 − 0.014𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 0.003𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 
                       [2.4159]       [1.3692]        [-0.4516]        [0.1954] 
    − 0.087𝑐𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 0.135𝑐𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡          
         [-4.7805]      [2.8288]  
T-values for the estimated coefficients are given in brackets. Only the coefficients of 
current year-on-year inflation variable, current and lagged current account variables were 
significant at a 5% significance level after using robust standard errors. The coefficients 
of EMP, our variable of interest is hereafter estimated. 
 
4.4 ANALYSIS OF CBI USING EMPIRICAL CBI INDEX 
In chapter 3, I explain that the structural differences among the 14 SSA countries 
with respect to how they respond to inflation, economic growth and current account 
surplus come out as unobserved heterogeneity across countries. Like Eijffinger et al 
(1996), I will infer these structural differences among the 14 SSA countries as a measure 
of their actual CBI. I have assumed from the start of this analysis that these unobserved 
heterogeneities are fixed over time. By using a fixed-effect estimator to regression (1), I 
include dummies for each country to capture each country’s unobserved heterogeneity. 
These dummies, collectively, is the variable of interest, 𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖 (for each country). The 
coefficients of the EMP variable is presented in Table 6 below.  
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From Table 6 below, the EMP is statistically significant at a 5% significance level 
for all countries except for Ethiopia, Tanzania and Uganda. That is, at a 5% significance 
level, the coefficient of EMP is significantly different from zero for all countries except 
Ethiopia, Tanzania and Uganda. I further test the robustness of the t-statistic for the EMP 
using a robust covariance matrix estimation and present the results in the Appendix. 
Using robust standard errors, the coefficients of EMP is statistically significant for only a 
few countries in the sample at a 10% significance level. Such a result is not surprising as 
Eijffinger et al (1996) explains that it would be too much to expect the included country 
dummies to differ significantly from one another2. For ease of comparison, I rank the 14 
SSA countries on their degree of independence using the EMP in Table 6 below. 
Based on the ranking in Table 6, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Uganda rank higher with 
respect to the EMP. I dub these countries as having strongly independent central banks. 
Relatively then, Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe have the least independent central 
banks. All the other countries have intermediate independent central banks based on the 
EMP. The ranking in Table 6 above differs slightly from that in Table 2. The central bank 
of Tanzania maintained its ranking as strongly independent. Surprising, Ethiopia, with a 
relatively dependent central bank based on CWN-W, has the most independent central 
bank. Ghana, Nigeria, Malawi and South Africa maintain their rank as having moderately 
independent central banks. Unsurprising, Zimbabwe has the least independent central 
bank whether ranked with the legal-based CBI index or the EMP. Among the countries in 
the sample, Zimbabwe has least reformed central bank (Nhavira and Ocran, 2014). The 
recent economic meltdown and hyperinflation in 2008 add credence to this conclusion. 
                                                          
2 See Eijffinger et al (1996, p.179) for further explanations 
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Table 6: Rank of empirical CBI index, the EMP 
 Country Empirical Independence 
1. Ethiopia -0.7356 [-1.1270] 
2. Tanzania -0.8402 [-1.7779] 
3. Uganda -0.9760 [-2.0310]* 
4. Mauritius -1.1316 [-1.9625] 
5. South Africa -1.2220 [-3.2189]** 
6. Kenya -1.5284 [-2.8489]** 
7. Malawi -1.5687 [-3.1220]** 
8. Nigeria -1.5985 [-2.8488]** 
9. Angola -1.6068 [-2.4848]* 
10. Ghana -1.6113 [-3.1598]** 
11. Namibia -1.6950 [-2.8488]*** 
12. Botswana -1.7472 [-4.1421]*** 
13. Zambia -1.7758 [-3.5084]*** 
14. Zimbabwe -2.1725 [-2.6802]** 
T statistics in parenthesis. Significance codes: ‘*’ p < 0.05, ‘**’ p < 0.01, ‘***’ p < 0.001 
 In Table 7 below, I test whether the legal-based CBI index (CWN-W) is 
correlated with this study’s estimated empirical CBI index (EMP). The Pearson’s 
product-moment correlation coefficient between the EMP and CWN-W is 0.135 
suggesting a positive correlation between the legal-based independence and the empirical 
index of CBI. Such a correlation is also significant at a 5% significance level. However, 
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the correlation is very weak and thus, the CWN-W is not the best proxy for the empirical 
CBI index.  
Table 7: Correlation test for positive correlation between the EMP and CWN-W 
Pearson’s Coefficient Significance (Two-tailed) 
0.145 2.7167 [0.006]** 
P-value in bracket. **Significant for a = 0.05; 
 I hereafter test the relationship between the empirical CBI index and year-on-year 
inflation. Table 8 below presents the correlation results between the EMP and year-on-
year inflation.  
Table 8: Correlation for empirical CBI index and year-on-year Inflation 
Pearson’s Coefficient Significance (Two-tailed) 
-0.278 -5.475 [8.262e-08]*** 
Source: Author’s estimates. P-value in bracket. ***Significant for a = 0.001 
The results in Table 8 above is consistent with the majority consensus in the literature 
suggesting a negative correlation between CBI and inflation. Even though the correlation 
coefficient shows a weak relationship, it nonetheless statistically significant. The 
implication of this result is as follows.  
 In chapter 2, I outline that since 1990s SSA countries have reformed their central 
banks’ charters to elevate inflation control as the core objective of monetary policy. With 
these reforms came improved autonomy of central banks in the sample countries. Thus, 
we should at least expect a negative relationship between CBI and inflation as informed 
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by the literature. From the discussion thus far, this paper has conjectured that the EMP 
could be a better proxy for CBI in SSA. Thus, we expected a more pronounce results with 
respect to the relationship between CBI and inflation using the EMP. 
Comparatively, the Person’s coefficient between the EMP and inflation is of a 
higher magnitude than that of the relationship between the CWN-W and inflation. 
Because this study undertakes only correction tests for the relationship between CBI and 
inflation using the CWN-W and EMP, this study cannot impose a causal relation between 
either of the CBI indexes and inflation. However, the inverse relationship between EMP 
and inflation affirm our intuition that a higher degree of CBI reflects in a low and stable 
inflation. The statistical significance of the result in Table 8 suggests that the reforms 
undertaken by the central banks in the 14 SSA economies have improved inflation-
fighting policies. We could not however draw the same conclusion with the correlation 
test between the legal-based CBI index and inflation. 
4.5 FURTHER REFINING OF THE ESTIMATION OF EMP 
 From the discussion thus far, I assume that the unobserved heterogeneity across 
countries is fixed over time. Similar to Eijffinger et al (1996), I ran the fixed effects 
estimator on my model to estimate the EMP by implicitly assuming that the unobserved 
heterogeneity across countries is related with the independent variables in the monetary 
policy reaction function. What if, the unobserved heterogeneity across countries is 
uncorrelated with the independent variables in the model. Then, the fixed effects model 
employed thus far is not the more consistent and efficient model.  I now test whether the 
fixed effects estimator consistent.  
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I run a Hausman test to evaluate whether using a fixed-effects estimator is 
consistent with the data. The hypothesis of the Hausman test is as follows. 
𝐻0: random effect (RE) estimator is consistent  
𝐻𝑎: fixed effect (FE) estimator is consistent 
The Hausman test evaluates whether or not the unobserved heterogeneity across countries 
and time are correlated with the independent variables. The null hypothesis assumes that 
the unobserved heterogeneity across countries and time are uncorrelated with the 
independent variables. If the null hypothesis is true, the fixed effects estimator is 
inefficient. On the other hand, the random effects estimator is efficient under the null 
hypothesis (Baltagi, 1998). The results of the Hausman test is presented in Table 9 below. 
Table 9: Results of Hausman Test 
 Chisq P-value 
FE vs RE 5.1372 0.5263 
Source: Author’s estimate from R. 
 From Table 7 above, the p-value from the Hausman test is insignificant at a 5% 
significance level. Thus, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the random effect 
estimator is the more consistent estimator. The Hausman test above suggests that the 
fixed effects estimator used thus far may be inconsistent. Nonetheless, there is a 
possibility that the fixed effects estimator may actually be the more consistent and 
efficient estimator. This is because, according to Baltagi (1998), if either serial 
correlation or heteroskedasticity is present in a model, the variances of fixed effects and 
random effects estimators are not valid. This consequently renders the Hausman test 
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statistic inappropriate (Baltagi, 1998). From the post-estimation regression diagnostic 
tests for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity carried out in sub-sections 4.3.4 and 
4.3.5 respectively, serial correlation and heteroskedasticity are present in my model. 
Thus, the possibility of the fixed effects estimator being the more consistent and efficient 
estimator is not far-fetched. 
In the presence of either serial correlation or heteroskedasticity, either an 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), a Generalized Least Squares (GLS) or Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimator can be used to estimate the model. With the 
OLS estimator, robust standard errors are used for estimates to be unbiased and 
consistent. GLS and FGLS estimators are more suited in the event where the error term 
has non-constant variance (heteroskedasticity) or the errors are correlated (serial 
correlation). That is, GLS and FGLS estimators incorporate the information about serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity while the OLS estimator does not. Thus, they provide a 
general structure for estimating unbiased and consistent estimates under the assumption 
of heteroskedasticity. When serial correlation and heteroskedasticity are present in a 
model, the GLS and FGLS estimators yield better estimates than the OLS estimator 
(Barreto & Howland, 2006, p. 599). 
To run GLS, one has to transform the regression model to correct for first-order 
serial correlation such that errors that are systematically related to previous errors are 
eliminated (Barreto & Howland, 2006). For instance, in a first-order serial correlation 
error model,  
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, where 𝜀𝑡 = 𝜌𝜀𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡 
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The whole object of GLS is to remove 𝜌𝜀𝑡−1 leaving only the pure error term, 𝑣𝑡 
(Barreto & Howland, 2006, p. 589). ρ thus is a crucial piece of information for the 
transformation of the data by the GLS or FGLS estimator. In practice however, Barreto 
and Howland (2006) intimate that ρ is unknown for most cases. Thus, GLS becomes 
unattainable in cases where ρ is unknown. With FGLS, the estimator runs an OLS 
regression initially to estimate ρ, which it uses to transform the model for further 
analysis. Given ρ is unknown in most cases, FGLS becomes the more viable alternative 
for estimating a model that accounts for serial correlation when ρ is unknown.  
Deciding which estimator to choose among the GLS and FGLS estimators also 
depends on varying factors like whether the true structure of the heteroskedasticity is 
known or whether or not the error covariance matrix is known. When the error 
covariance matrix is known, the GLS estimator is the more unbiased and consistent 
estimator. On the other hand, the FGLS estimator is the more unbiased and consistent 
estimator when the error covariance matrix is unknown. As in practice most models have 
heteroskedasticity with unknown error covariance matrix, I run FGLS on my model, as 
an improvement on the estimation in sub-sections 4.3.6.  
I perform a Hausman test on whether to use a fixed-effects or random-effects 
FGLS estimator. Results of the Hausman test presented in the Appendix point to fixed-
effects FGLS estimation. The fixed-effects FGLS estimator estimates the error 
covariance matrix using fixed effects estimation. The results of the FGLS regression is 
presented below.  
∆𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  0.488𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 0.259𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 − 0.026𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 0.001𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 
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    [22.4862]        [7.5497]        [-8.8416]        [0.4634] 
    − 0.064𝑐𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 0.08𝑐𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖 + 𝑒𝑡           
         [-44.7713]      [35.4209 ]  
Absolute z-statistic for the coefficients are presented in brackets.  I estimate the 
unobserved heterogeneity across countries in Table 8 below. For ease of comparison, I 
rank the 14 SSA economies based on the estimated EMP using FGLS. 
Table 10: FGLS estimation of the EMP 
 
Country Estimate 
1 Angola 0.036[0.116] 
2 Ethiopia 0.011[0.018] 
3 Tanzania -0.226[-0.798] 
4 Uganda -0.261[-0.845] 
5 Zimbabwe -0.290[-0.555] 
6 Mauritius -0.367[-0.756] 
7 Nigeria -0.535[-1.230] 
8 South Africa -0.545[-1.858]* 
9 Kenya -0.565[-1.302] 
10 Ghana -0.666[-2.421]** 
11 Botswana -0.666[-2.485]** 
12 Malawi -0.666[-2.428]** 
13 Zambia -0.693[-2.276]** 
14 Namibia -0.703[-2.161]*** 
Source: Author’s estimates from R. Significance codes: ‘*’ p < 0.1, ‘**’ p < 0.05, 
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The estimates in Table 10 above is consistent with that of Table 6. Only 
Zimbabwe has an improved CBI moving from a least CBI zone to an intermediate CBI 
zone. These few estimates are however statistically significant at a significance level of 
5%.  
Table 11: Correlation for EMP estimated with fixed effects FGLS and YOY 
Inflation 
Pearson’s Coefficient Significance (Two-tailed) 
0.177 3.4035 [0.00074]*** 
Source: Author’s estimates. P-value in bracket. ***Significant for a = 0.001 
The results in Table 11 above is consistent with the majority consensus in the literature 
suggesting a negative correlation between CBI and inflation. Similar to Presnak’s (2005), 
this study finds a positive relationship between CBI and inflation with the EMP estimates 
from fixed effects FGLS estimation. 
This study thus far has investigated the relationship between CBI and inflation. 
The results however seem inconsistent at best. The relationship between CBI and 
inflation depends on the CBI indicator employed. The legal-based CBI index renders the 
relationship between CBI and inflation insignificant. The estimated CBI index based on 
Eijffinger et al’s (1996) renders a more consistent result as informed by literature. Further 
refinement of Eijffinger et al’s (1996) methodology with respect to the econometric 
technique employed also renders the relationship inconclusive. The result thus far 
confirms Lucotte’s (2009) conclusion that empirical results on CBI in SSA are sensitive 
to the CBI index used. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
In this section, I will summarize the findings and the conclusions drawn from this 
study.  
5.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 From the onset, this study sought to empirically investigate the relationship 
between inflation and central bank independence. Two CBI indicators were used: a legal-
based CBI indicator as well as an empirical CBI index estimated by this study. The 
hypotheses that were tested in this study is as follows.  
𝐻0: Central bank independence is not correlated with inflation. 
𝐻1: Central bank independence is correlated with inflation   
 Findings from this study showed the following. When the legal-based CBI 
indicator was used, the correlation between central bank independence and inflation was 
almost non-existent, inconclusive and statistically insignificant. On the other hand, when 
the empirical CBI index was employed to perform the Pearson’s correlation between 
inflation and central bank independence, the results were consistent with theory. That is, 
central bank independence and inflation were negatively correlated as informed by 
literature.  
 Upon further refinement of the estimation process of the empirical index of CBI, 
the relationship between inflation and central bank independence, though statistically 
significant, was positive. This result is anomalous as it is contrary to theory which 
suggests that the higher the degree of central bank independence, the lower and more 
stable the inflation rate, all else being equal. 
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5.2 CONCLUSIONS 
 The evidence from this study suggests that legal CBI indicators have little or no 
explanatory power with respect to level and variability of inflation in the sample SSA 
countries. The relationship between inflation and central bank independence comes out 
more conclusively when the empirical CBI index estimated in this study is used. As the 
literature informs that there exists an actual negative relationship between CBI and 
inflation, this study concludes that, the empirical CBI index more appropriately captures 
CBI in SSA. As the relationship between CBI and inflation from the findings tend to be 
very sensitive to the CBI indicator used, this study fails to refute Lucotte’s (2009) claim 
that empirical results on CBI in SSA are sensitive to the CBI index used. 
5.3 RECOMMENDATION 
 In the literature review, I outline some reforms undertaken by economies in SSA 
to improve monetary policy implementation. Results from this study, though not robust, 
suggesting that indeed, these reforms have improved the relationship between CBI and 
inflation in SSA. With more reforms thus, we expect the level and variability of inflation 
to be low and more stable, all else being equal. Policy makers should thus expend more 
efforts to maintain, reform and improve central banking in SSA.    
5.4 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES 
 Further studies on the central bank independence would face the inevitable 
difficulty of choosing the appropriate measure of CBI for empirical studies. Until legal 
based CBI indicators actually reflect CBI in SSA, further improvement can be made to 
the empirical CBI index in this paper. For starters, a larger sample of countries as well as 
advanced econometric techniques would be more helpful in estimating robust results. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Rank of empirical CBI index, the EMP—Robust Covariance Matrix 
Estimation 
 Country Empirical Independence 
1. Ethiopia -0.7356 [-0.7825] 
2. Tanzania -0.8402 [-1.7779] 
3. Uganda -0.9760 [-1.3490] 
4. Mauritius -1.1316 [-1.3319] 
5. South Africa -1.2220 [-1.7531]. 
6. Kenya -1.5284 [-1.4958] 
7. Malawi -1.5687 [1.7432]. 
8. Nigeria -1.5985 [-1.5171] 
9. Angola -1.6068 [-1.0434] 
10. Ghana -1.6113 [-1.7383]. 
11. Namibia -1.6950 [-1.7531]. 
12. Botswana -1.7472 [-1.6951]. 
13. Zambia -1.7758 [-1.6791]. 
14. Zimbabwe -2.1725 [-1.0715] 
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Figure A1: Correlation between EMP and Inflation 
 
Figure A1: Correlation between EMP, estimated with FGLS and Inflation 
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Table A2: Hausman Test: fixed-effects FGLS vs random-effects FGLS 
 Chisq P-value 
FE vs RE 2763.9 2.2e-16 
Source: Author’s estimate from R. 
Table A3: Correlation matrix of independent variables 
 EMP CWN-W EMP-FGLS (fixed) EMP-FGLS (random) 
EMP 1.00    
CWN-W 0.13 1.00   
EMP-FGLS (fixed) 0.47 0.07 1.00  
EMP-FGLS (random) 0.90 -0.02 0.72 1.00 
Source: Author’s estimate from R. 
Table A4: Correlation for EMP estimated with random effects FGLS and YOY 
Inflation 
Pearson’s Coefficient Significance (Two-tailed) 
-0.178 -3.4244 [0.00069]*** 
Source: Author’s estimates. P-value in bracket. ***Significant for a = 0.001 
